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Experimental realization of Counterfactual Quantum Cryptography
G. Brida, A. Cavanna, I. P. Degiovanni, M. Genovese, P. Traina
INRIM, Strada delle Cacce 91, Torino 10135, Italy
In counterfactual QKD information is transfered, in a secure way, between Alice and Bob even
when no particle carrying the information is in fact transmitted between them. In this letter we
fully implement the scheme for counterfactual QKD proposed in [T. Noh, Phys. Rev. Lett. 103,
230501 (2009)], demonstrating for the first time that information can be transmitted between two
parties without the transmission of a carrier.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ta, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Ex, 42.50.St
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a method for
transmitting a secret key between two partners (usually
named Alice and Bob) by exploiting quantum properties
of light. The most important characteristic of this idea
is that the secrecy of the generated key is guaranteed by
the very laws of nature, i.e. by the properties of quan-
tum states [1, 2]. In the last decade QKD is moving from
laboratories to become a mature technology for commer-
cialization [3]; communications over more than 100 km
having been achieved both in fiber [4] and open air [5].
However, beyond its commercial interest QKD repre-
sents also a fruitful test bed of concepts and ideas blos-
soming from quantum information theory and studies on
foundations of quantum mechanics [1, 2, 6–10].
In this sense a very interesting scheme was recently
presented on this journal by Noh [11], who suggested a
QKD protocol (usually called N09) where the informa-
tion is transmitted, in a secure way, between Alice and
Bob even when no particle carrying the information is in
fact transmitted between them. In essence the scheme
exploits a counterfactual measurement, for this reason it
is also known as Counterfactual QKD (CQKD).
The counterfactual measurement, which relies on fun-
damental properties of quantum mechanics, is a typical
example of interaction-free measurement that detects the
state of an object without an interaction occurring be-
tween it and the measuring device. One of the most
widely known application of counterfactual measurement
can be found in the Elitzur-Vaidman bomb-testing prob-
lem [12], a well known thought experiment successfully
experimentally implemented in the nineties [13].
CQKD [11] challenges the usual paradigma requiring
an effective transmission of a signal carrier (usually a
photon) between the two parties exchanging information
and therefore represents a very important conceptual de-
velopment paving the way to further studies.
In Ref. [14] a more efficient and complicated CQKD
was proposed, whereas security issues of the N09 protocol
were considered in Ref. [15], where it was proved its un-
conditional security by considering its equivalence to an
entanglement distillation protocol. Finally, very recently,
a security proof for intercept-resend attacks in realistic
situation (non unit detector efficiency and presence of
dark counts) was provided [16].
A first attempt to realize experimentally Noh’s scheme
is reported in Ref. [17]. However, this set up missed
the key element of CQKD, since the photon was indeed
transmitted between Alice and Bob.
In this letter we fully implement the N09 CQKD
scheme, demonstrating for the first time that informa-
tion can be transmitted between two parties without the
transmission of an information carrier.
To explain the principle of the proposed protocol, we
describe an alternative version, absolutely equivalent to
the original one [11], which is shown in Fig.1 (a).
Alice randomly rotates the single photon polarization
(which originally is to be assumed horizontal) by means
of a half wave plate (HWPA), either by 0 (bit value ”0”)
or by pi/2 (bit value ”1”). Then, the photon enters one
port of a 50 : 50 beam splitter (BS), which is the first
element of a Michelson interferometer. After BS, accord-
ing to the polarization, the photon is in one of the two
orthogonal states:
|φ0〉 = (|0〉A|H〉B + i|H〉A|0〉B)/
√
2 (1)
|φ1〉 = (|0〉A|V 〉B + i|V 〉A|0〉B)/
√
2 (2)
The path A of the interferometer (containing an optical
delay OD and a mirror) is inside Alice’s sector, while
path B reaches Bob’s one.
Bob randomly selects one of the two polarisations and
detects the photon in this polarisation allowing the pho-
ton in the complementary polarisation to fly back to Al-
ice’s site. This is achieved exploiting the HWPB and the
Polarizing beam splitter (PBS). In particular, as the PBS
addresses the |V 〉 photon towards D2, while |H〉 photon
is sent towards the mirror (M), rotations of the polariza-
tion of 0 and pi/2 induced by the HWPB correspond to
the detection of |V 〉 and |H〉 photon state by D2. If the
photon is not detected by D2 but reflected back by M it
passes through the HWPB in the selected position, thus
the photon gains back its original polarization state in-
terfering with itself at BS at Alice’s site and, for a proper
tuning of the optical delay OD, it deterministically exits
in D0.
When Alice and Bob select complementary polariza-
tion rotations, then either the photon is transmitted by
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FIG. 1: (a): scheme of the setup for Counterfactual QKD
experiment equivalent to the one proposed by by Noh [11].
(b) Setup of the implemented version of the protocol.
BS and detected by Bob at D2 with 50% probability
(since its polarization at PBS is vertical), or it is reflected
in path A and consequently detected by D0 or D1 with
equal probability (25%).
After the detection is completed Alice and Bob can
communicate each other whether or not each of the de-
tectors clicked. If clicked either D0 or D2, with the pur-
pose of detecting the intervention of an eventual eaves-
dropper, they announce both the detected and the initial
polarization state. If D1 clicks Alice compares the ini-
tial and final polarization states: if they are consistent
she does not reveal any information, otherwise she an-
nounces her result. Alice and Bob can then establish a
common key by using only the events when the photon
was detected at D1 with the correct polarization.
The only apparent difference between the scheme dis-
cussed here and the original proposal in Ref [11] is in
the apparatus used by Bob to detect the photon at D2.
Nonetheless the one shown accomplishes exactly the same
task, thus the two schemes should be considered abso-
lutely equivalent.
The very interesting point of this scheme is that the
selection of events only at detector D1 correspond to pho-
tons that have traveled path A, i.e. never exited Alice’s
sector. Therefore, the task of creating a secret key has
been accomplished without any photon carrying the in-
formation having been outside Alice’s laboratory.
In the following we present the results of our equiva-
lent implementation of the protocol which is completely
analogous to the one of Fig. 1(a), but it is based on a
Mach-Zehnder interferometer instead of a Michelson in-
terferometer.
In our experimental set up, as shown in Fig. 1(b),
a heralded single photon source exploiting parametric
down-conversion (PDC) is used : a 100 mW laser emit-
ting at 406 nm in continuous-wave regime pumps a type-I
BBO crystal producing degenerate PDC at 812 nm. The
emission of the PDC photons is slightly non-collinear cor-
responding to an emission angle of approximately 3◦ with
respect to the pump direction. The heralding photon af-
ter passing through a 10 nm bandwidth interferential fil-
ter and a 4 mm wide pinhole is coupled to a multi-mode
fiber and addressed to the trigger detector. The her-
alded photon, to be used as our true single photon state,
is selected by an interferential filter (1 nm FWHM) and
coupled to a single mode fiber leading to the input of the
interferometer.
The latter is a balanced Mach-Zehnder Interferome-
ter (MZI) in which each arm has an adjustable trombone
prism. One of the two arms is entirely included in Alice’s
site, while the other contains both the quantum channel
and Bob’s site, the latter being composed by a PBS be-
tween two half-wave plates (HWPB1, HWPB2) and D2
detector.
The balance of the interferometer is guaranteed by a
closed–loop piezo–electric movement system, which sta-
bilizes the position of one of the trombones regulating the
length difference between the two optical paths inside the
MZI with nanometric resolution.
The outputs of the interferometer, after spatial selec-
tion via 1 mm diameter-wide irises, are then coupled in
multi-mode fiber with no further spectral selection and
all the signals (including the heralding photons and D2
clicks) are revealed by Single Photon Avalanche Detec-
tors (SPADs) with a ≈ 60% detection efficiency at 812
nm.
Coincidence and time-tag analysis of the incoming sig-
nals are performed by means of PicoQuant HydraHarp
400 multichannel picosecond event timer. All the re-
ported data were acquired in measurements of 20 sec-
onds. Our results show good agreement with the theo-
retical predictions and represent a proof of principle of
the experimental feasibility of CQKD.
In Fig. 2 interference fringes with high visibility can be
observed in the coincidence counts between the herald-
ing channel and each of the MZI output detectors D0 and
D1 as a function of the displacement of the prism balanc-
ing the interferometer (within the coherence length of the
signal, which, according to the filters used, is of the order
of hundreds of µm) when Alice and Bob use compatible
sets of polarization rotation angles ({θA, θB} = {0, 0} or
{θA, θB} = {pi/2, pi/2}). It can also be noticed that for
this choice of angles the D2 counts are consistent with
zero as expected. In particular, when no rotation at
all is performed ({0, 0}), the maximum visibilities are
(92 ± 4)% for D0 and (96 ± 4)% for D1, while interfer-
ence gets slightly spoiled for {pi/2, pi/2} where the vis-
ibilities for D0 and D1 are respectively (87 ± 4)% and
(91 ± 4)%, values which, nonetheless, are sufficient for
the proof of the protocol. The uncertainty on the visibil-
ities is obtained assuming a Poissonian distribution for
3FIG. 2: Coincidence counts between the heralding channel
and each of the MZI output detectors D0, D1 and D2 in 20
seconds acquisitions as a function of the displacement of the
prism balancing the interferometer when Alice and Bob use
compatible sets of angles (top figure: {0, 0}; bottom figure:
{pi/2, pi/2}). For this choice of angles an interference pattern
(with visibilities generally above 90%) can be observed in the
D0 and D1 counts and also control counts (D2) are consistent
with zero as expected.
the coincidence counts. Fig. 3 shows the stability of the
interferometer in a half-an-hour long measurement when
the balance of the two optical paths is fixed.
The performances of our key distribution process are
summarized in Table I. Corresponding to the angles
{0, pi/2} and {pi/2, 0}, D1 and D0 counts are approxi-
mately equal, as in this condition no interference should
be present. These are the events relative to the actual
transmission of information. In fact, the clicking of D1
delivers a bit of the secret key between the users even if
no real photon travels in the quantum channel.
In order to characterize the communication it is nec-
essary to estimate the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER)
defined as the ratio between the probability for Bob to
register an incorrect bit and the sum of the probabilities
FIG. 3: Counting events showing the stability of the interfer-
ometer in a half-an-hour long measurement when the balance
of the two optical paths is fixed.
of getting either a correct or an incorrect bit. In our case
Bob gets an incorrect bit when D1 clicks even if Alice and
Bob use the same angle of polarization rotations and the
events related to the correct transmission are those in
which D1 clicks when interference is destroyed. Further-
more, we notice that when Alice and Bob use complemen-
tary polarizations the amount of photons with the wrong
polarization detected by D1 is effectively null when dark
counts are subtracted. We can thus define QBER as
QBER =
PD1,int
PD1,int + PD1,nint
(3)
where PD1,int is the probability for D1 to register a pho-
ton when Alice’s and Bob’s polarization rotations are
equal, such that there is (destructive) interference, and
PD1,nint is the analogous probability in the case in which
Alice and Bob choose different angles.
For our measurements the mean QBER is QBER =
(12 ± 1)%. We underline that all the reported measure-
ments are obtained without subtraction of background
and accidental counts. If we account for these contri-
butions, the corrected QBER value decreases noticeably
to QBER′ = (7 ± 1)%, as would be the case if more
reliable detectors were used, such as detectors affected
by a lower dark count rate. As already mentioned, the
protocol has been demonstrated absolutely secure when
ideal single photon sources are employed. To address the
security problems eventually raised by the practical im-
plementation of the protocol, firstly we tested it against
possible photon-number-splitting attacks, i. e. we in-
vestigated the quality of of our heralded single photon
source. From the measured count rates we obtained a
value of g2(0) = (7± 5) ∗ 10−9, which clearly shows neg-
ligible presence of multi-photon components. The rea-
4son for such a small value is related to the very low
level of count rates (180 maximum in 20 seconds acqui-
sitions) at the detectors. This is basically due to the
poor coupling efficiency of the heralded source (approx-
imately 5%), the strict spectral selection on the herald-
ing photons (1 nm FWHM filtering with 26% transmit-
tance), and also because of the spatial selection at the
interferometers output (we used irises as narrow as 1mm
in diameter to optimize the visibility of the interference
fringes). Furthermore, a small temporal detection win-
dow (1 ns) was selected in correspondence of the arrival
of the heralding photon. Because of this temporal post-
selection we mention that unheralded photons may travel
inside the channel and Eve may exploit that to get sig-
nificant information by intercepting them. In order to
overcome this security issue, shuttered heralded single-
photon sources [20] should be considered a valuable solu-
tion, as they present comparable performances with re-
spect to the non-shuttered ones. Future developments of
the scheme will include shuttered sources together with
stabilized fiber interferometers for wider distance.
We also address the issue of robustness of the protocol
against more general attacks by computing the difference
m = IAB− IAE, where IAB (IAE) is the mutual informa-
tion between Alice and Bob (Alice and Eve), in the cases
of general Intercept-Resend attacks and ”Time-Shift” at-
tacks. Following the models suggested in Ref. [16], one
can express m for the intercept-resend attack as
mIR = PD1[1− h( Pe1
PD1
)], (4)
where PD1, Pe1 are respectively the click probability and
the error probability at D1 and h(x) is the binary Shan-
non Entropy. Regarding the time-shift attack, where Eve
exploits the non-ideality of the detectors, one must sub-
tract from the previous value two contributions, obtain-
ing:
mTS = mIR − γ −∆IAE(η), (5)
where γ accounts for the maximum corrupted bit rate
due to dark counts and ∆IAE(η) =
1−η
2η
(PD2 − Pe2) is
the increment of the mutual information between A and
E due to non-unit efficiency of the detectors.
Both values calculated from the collected data are pos-
itive (mIR = 0.23 ± 0.04, mTS = 0.15 ± 0.06), ensuring
the possibility of distributing a secret key [1, 2]
Altogether our results provide a satisfying proof-of-
principle of the QKD scheme realized in free-space.
Nonetheless, recent results on the implementation of high
stability fiber based Mach-Zehnder interferometers (over
distances of the order of some km) [18, 19] certify the pos-
sibility of exploiting this protocol in ”real-life” (as well
as commercial) applications.
In conclusion in this paper we have presented the
first experimental demonstration of counterfactual QKD.
{0, 0} {0, pi/2} {pi/2, pi/2} {pi/2, 0}
CD0 180± 4 59± 2 159± 4 59± 2
CD1 7.9 ± 0.9 53± 2 7.2 ± 0.9 59± 2
CD2 6.6 ± 0.8 85± 3 5.4 ± 0.7 86± 3
VD0 (92± 4)% (0± 4)% (0± 4)% (87± 4)%
VD1 (96± 4)% (0± 4)% (0± 4)% (91± 4)%
QBER (12± 1)%
TABLE I: Resume of the main results in the implementation
of the CQKD protocol proposed in Ref. [11]. Each column
refers to a set {θA, θB} of polarization rotation performed
by the users and CDi labels the mean coincidence counts at
the i-th detector in acquisition of 20 seconds. VD0, VD1 are
the visibilities of the interference fringes observed at the two
outputs of the interferometer by scanning the path length
difference between the two arms of the MZI. QBER is the
estimated quantum bit error rate for the transmission .
This result, beyond its eventual practical interest, has a
huge conceptual significance since it demonstrates for the
first time as information can be transmitted between two
partners, thanks to quantum systems peculiar properties,
in a situation where no carrier has been actually trans-
mitted between them.
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